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CONCLUSION 
Ronald Thiemann's Religion in Public Life is truly a wel-
come addition to the ever-expanding literature on religion, law, 
and politics. His work presents a well-reasoned, even-handed, 
and intellectually defensible attempt to bring some measure of 
balance to its subject. Though perhaps slightly too abstract in its 
formulation and possibly a bit too wide-ranging in its breadth, 
these arguably are signs not of commonplace deficiency, but of 
its potentiality as a work of genuine cultural significance. Espe-
cially noteworthy is Thiemann's attempt to render the philosoph-
ical and legal dimensions of the debate over religion in public life 
accessible to a relatively broad readership. Frequently confined 
to certain elite or professional quarters, this debate plainly has 
relevance that extends well beyond the academic halls and judi-
cial chambers. The periodic manifestation of elite discourse 
through legal doctrines and other expressions of public policy, 
and the frequent assertion by proponents that many of its constit-
uent arguments are simply expressions of our deep constitutional 
commitments, demand that it not, in fact, stray too far from the 
public domain. Religion in Public Life laudably attempts to rein 
in both the esotericism and the ideological excess of this debate, 
and in so doing makes a genuine contribution to the present and 
future understanding of religion as an indelible feature of the 
American political landscape. 
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION. By Scott Douglas Gerbef.l New York 
and London: New York University Press. 1995. Pp. 315 
Cloth $45.00. 
Stephen B. Presserz 
For some time, Constitutional interpretation in the Ameri-
can courts and academy has been borrowing from other disci-
plines. At the height of the Warren Court's adventures in 
Constitutional law-making, for example, sociology and social 
1. Scott Douglas Gerber, Ph.D., J.D., is Visiting Assistant Professor of Govern-
ment at the College of William and Mary. 
2. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History at Northwestern University School of 
Law, and currently a Fulbright Senior Scholar and an Adams Fellow at the Institute of 
United States Studies at the University of London. 
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psychology were useful adjuncts to Constitutional law, most fa-
mously in Brown's Footnote 11. As academics sought to under-
stand, or perhaps to justify, what the Warren Court had done, 
other bodies of knowledge were turned to, most prominently 
moral philosophy, as in the work of Ronald Dworkin, Michael 
Perry, and others. John Hart Ely, and those influenced by him, 
tried to recast Constitutional Law as applied pluralistic political 
science. In the meantime other scholars, most notably Richard 
Posner, had been experimenting with borrowing from classical 
economics, and, in just the recent past, Constitutional theorists 
have raided the domain of American historians. 
While the lawyers were up to all that, among historians, 
something called "republicanism" was all the rage, as Ameri-
canists sought to argue that it wasn't Lockean liberalism (with its 
purportedly attendant possessive individualism) that was at the 
bottom of the struggle for the Federal Constitution, but rather an 
altruistic and disinterested attempt to promote communitarian 
values in general and civic virtue in particular. I can't speak for 
the fate of most of the other disciplines, but I can say with some 
confidence that it wasn't long before historians decided that "re-
publicanism" was a much more complex matter than simply a 
desire to promote civic virtue, and the historical fraternity ap-
pears to be on the way to concluding that the early history of our 
republic can best be understood by considering Republicanism as 
only one of at least three important civic ideologies-the other 
two being the formerly discredited Lockean Liberalism and the 
once popular-but more recently neglected-Protestant Christian-
ity.3 These developments in historiography have not yet ade-
quately been reflected in Constitutional jurisprudence, which 
tends superficially to borrow from the other social sciences, as 
other disciplines lose their degrees of nuance when employed by 
lawyers. 
In any event, at the same time these attempts to raid social 
science for guidance on the Constitution were under way there 
was always a feeling that perhaps law could be regarded as at 
least a semi-autonomous scientific discipline. This feeling was 
manifested, surely, by Herbert Wechsler's famous effort to dis-
cern neutral principles for constitutional interpretation, and per-
haps in the work of several of his disciples, most notably 
Alexander Bickel. Most recently the jurisprudence of neutral 
3. The seminal piece in this regard is James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liber-
alism· Christillnity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. 
Am. Hist. 9 (1987). 
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principles, now in the guise of original intention or original un-
derstanding, was carried out-primarily by critics of Warren 
Court expansionism-by Messrs. Meese, Bork, and Berger. 
The newest game in constitutional interpretation town, I sus-
pect, is the effort by several scholars of late eighteenth century 
history (among whose numbers I modestly include myself)4 to 
move beyond what might have been perceived as a negative ap-
proach to original intention or original understanding, and to ap-
preciate the early Constitution on its own terms, informed not by 
current philosophical fads in the legal or arts and sciences facul-
ties, but (adopting the latest work by American historians) rather 
by an understanding of the complex of philosophical, political, 
and economic conceptions that were prevalent at the time of the 
Constitution's drafting and adoption. This is a tricky business, 
because to do it properly requires not only legal training, but 
probably professional training in history (or at least enough years 
to get grandfathered in), and/or perhaps even an advanced de-
gree in political science or government. 
As if this were not enough, an attempt must be made to ap-
preciate the social sciences in the manner of our Framers, when 
law, politics, economics, history, moral philosophy, and religion 
were all integrated pieces of one holistic approach to life and law. 
Not for nothing was what we now know as economics called 
"political economy," and common it was for many of the found-
ing generation to believe that it was impossible to implement law 
without morality and morality without religion. 
The results of a new kind of interdisciplinary approach to 
and appreciation of the late eighteenth century founding years 
have begun to accumulate, and they seem promising and exciting. 
1\vo notable efforts in this regard are William Casto's recent 
book on the early federal courts,s and David Mayer's interdisci-
plinary study of Thomas Jefferson's constitutional theory (such as 
it was).6 Now, in this vein, comes Scott Gerber's new book on 
constitutional interpretation, To Secure These Rights. 
Like Casto and Mayer, Gerber deploys interdisciplinary 
tools, most prominently those acquired as a Ph.D. studying under 
Henry Abraham at Virginia. The result is an extraordinarily am-
4. Stephen B. Presser, Recapturing the Constitution: Race, Religion, and Abonion 
Reconsidered (Regnery Pub., 1994) and Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law 
and Jurisprudence in American History (West, 3d ed. 1995). 
5. Wtlliam R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justice-
ships of John Jay and Oliver Ellswonh (U. of South Carolina Press, 1995). 
6. David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (U. Press of 
Virginia, 1994). 
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bitious and, given the possible pitfalls, a remarkably successful 
first book, an essay in constitutional exegesis which should now 
be required reading for anyone seeking to understand the ani-
mating spirit of the 1787 document and the Bill of Rights which 
followed. Gerber's work is not free from problems (whose is?), 
and it is probably fair to say that he raises almost as many ques-
tions as he answers, but in his volume, as was true for earlier 
efforts by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock,7 to 
provoke disagreement and discussion is likely to be the mark of a 
vital and seminal work. . 
Indeed, it is Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock who furnish the start-
ing-off point for Gerber. To Secure These Rights is an attempt to 
shift focus from "Republican" or "Civic virtue" explanations of 
the origin of our constitutional law, and to return to an apprecia-
tion of the Lockean influence on the framers. (pp. 23-32) Not 
even the most zealous advocates of the Republican reading of 
the Constitution (with exception of the strange attempt by Garry 
Willss) argued that Locke was not influential in the writing of the 
Declaration of Independence, but virtually all American histori-
ans have recently argued that America, in the years following the 
Declaration, moved away from Locke, as it was demonstrated 
that Lockean notions, when put into practice, seemed to lead to 
legislative irresponsibility and nearly total breakdowns in Ameri-
can provincial government. Indeed, as the Constitution itself was 
in the process of being drafted, rebels in Western Massachusetts 
who had declared themselves in a Lockean state of nature and 
had rendered nugatory the power of state authorities had just 
been subdued. 
In the course of his reexamination of the notions of Locke, 
the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution, Gerber 
concludes that it is wrong to think that the influence of the Dec-
laration suddenly evaporated. Instead, after a review of the writ-
ings of such framers as Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Wilson, as 
well as Jefferson, he makes out a powerful case that the Declara-
tion was still very much in the minds of both the Constitution's 
proponents and its foes, and that the Constitution is best under-
7. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap 
Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776·1787 (U. of 
North Carolina Press, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Polit· 
ical Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton U. Press, 1975). 
8. Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 
(Doubleday & Co., 1978). Says Gerber, "Most scholars no longer take Wills's Scottish 
[Enlightenment] reading of the Declaration of Independence seriously, believing that his 
thesis was demolished in a superb review essay by Ronald Hamoway." (27n.) 
1997] BOOK REVIEWS 233 
stood, as his title suggests, as a means of implementing the rights 
outlined in the Declaration. 
The Declaration's Lockean inalienable rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness (or perhaps the accumulation of 
property) furnish Gerber with a dynamic constitutional philoso-
phy which allows the possibility of adopting the Constitution to 
meet the exigencies of a people struggling to establish a just soci-
ety in a manner not yet seen in history. Gerber concludes that 
the proper posture of constitutional interpreters, then and now, 
is what he calls "liberal originalism." (pp. 1-4, 6-8) He believes 
that he is being faithful to the original understandings of the doc-
ument's drafters and ratifiers, but he eschews what he regards as 
the modem "conservative" approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion, which he says demands that the constitution be read simply 
as the establishment of a majority-rule democracy. (pp. 4-6) 
Gerber shares with many current conservatives the belief 
that the Warren and Berger courts improperly made constitu-
tional law according to their particular political preferences 
rather than following any valid constitutional philosophy (and he 
singles out Justices Brennan and Marshall for special excoria-
tion). (See, e.g., pp. 9-11, 177) But he believes that conservatives 
such as Meese and Bork and some of their positivist fellow trav-
elers have failed to appreciate that the Constitution was about 
more than popular sovereignty, and that instead it was to incor-
porate a jurisprudence of natural rights. 
One could certainly quibble with Gerber's definition of 
"conservative" here-he probably too easily links Meese and 
Bork with Blackstone and Burke, and fails to realize that a 
Burkean approach to law might well include some of the juris-
prudential approaches he favors9-but he does succeed in fatally 
undermining the historical arguments that some conservatives 
have been making against a jurisprudence informed by supra-
constitutional principles. He demolishes this positivistic ap-
proach, for example, by demonstrating quite nicely that the only 
Justice to argue against a natural-rights based jurisprudence of 
the constitution (to argue, in other words, against "great princi-
ples of republican government" which circumscribed any Ameri-
can legislature-state or federal), Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 
was not only quite out of step with his contemporaries, but inex-
plicably had abandoned his own clear views to the contrary 
voiced a scant few years before. (pp. 111-112, 118-119) 
9. On this point see generally Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 
4). 
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Somewhat more troubling difficulties are presented, how-
ever, by what often seems to be Gerber's notion that the "natural 
rights" philosophy of the Declaration ought to be regarded as the 
be-all and end-all for Constitutional interpretation. He is cer-
tainly to be commended for elegantly laying out what the past, 
present, and future content of such a jurisprudence would look 
like. His book is a particular delight, as well, because he actually 
takes a stand on the most difficult constitutional questions now 
facing us, for example those involving race, religion, abortion, 
sexual preference, and the right to die. (pp. 164-195) Still, in 
order to pull this off, Gerber is forced to move his "natural 
rights" notions from the Declaration and Locke to a higher level 
of generality than that employed by the framers or by Locke 
himself, (see, e.g., pp. 189-190) and once he moves to this higher 
level of generality it is difficult not to conclude that his theory 
would suffer from the same open-ended character of that, say, 
manifested by Justice Brennan.lo 
Thus, when Gerber finds in the purported Lockean natural 
rights philosophy of the Declaration support for the notion that 
the Supreme Court should find that state or federal governments 
may not punish consensual sodomy or discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation, (pp. 189-190) or that prayer in the schools 
should not be permitted, (p.5) or that there ought to be a consti-
tutionally-recognizable right to die for persons in unbearable dis-
tress, (p. 180) one is excused if one raises an eyebrow. Less 
problematic, and dead-on, I think, are his claims that the Consti-
tution ought to be interpreted in a manner which results, in racial 
cases, in equality of opportunity but not equality of outcome, (p. 
174) and that a woman's "right" to have an abortion could not 
exist in the constitution if the fetus is recognized as a human life. 
(p. 182) 
But even if Gerber, in his admirable zeal to apply his basic 
theory, gets it a bit wrong, that doesn't necessarily mean that his 
theory itself is flawed. Indeed his basic premise, or what he calls 
his "underlying theme," that "the Constitution cannot be prop-
erly understood without recourse to history, political philosophy, 
and law-all three" ought to be inscribed on the fly-leaves of all 
texts in first-year Constitutional law. So how might one avoid 
the open-ended problems of Constitutional interpretation to 
10. Indeed, it is just this sort of moving to higher levels of generality that recently 
allowed Michael Perry to make the curious claim that it is proper to view William Bren-
nan as an originalist. Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 213 
n.15 (Oxford U. Press, 1994). To his credit, Gerber appears implicitly, at least, to ac-
knowledge this problem. (p. 9n.) 
1997] BOOK REVIEWS 235 
which Gerber is also dedicated to avoiding? An answer, I think, 
is implicit in an observation that he has himself made, but has not 
yet fully developed. That is that while "Modem students of polit-
ical philosophy and jurisprudence often draw distinctions be-
tween terms like 'natural equity,' 'natural justice,' 'natural law,' 
and 'natural rights,' ... An examination of the early cases reveals 
that early American judges and lawyers typically did not make 
such distinctions." (p. 106 n. *) 
What this means, I think, is that if one wants truly to be an 
originalist, one cannot simply rely, as Gerber too often does, ex-
clusively on an individualistic "natural rights" Lockean philoso-
phy. One must also take into account (as the Framers most 
assuredly did) Ciceronian or Thomistic ideas of universal natural 
law, Aristotelian conceptions of justice, and the English common 
law's concepts of inherent powers of government and duties of 
the subject. Moreover, while Republicanism and Christianity 
ought not to be regarded (as Gerber quite properly claims they 
ought not to be) as the exclusive guides to Constitutional inter-
pretation, they are surely of some importance in understanding 
the way the framers approached constitutional problems.ll Also 
of more importance than Gerber accords to it, I think, was the 
movement both in the Constitution and certainly in the Bill of 
Rights to safeguard rights and liberties by preserving the dual 
sovereignty of state and federal governments. If Gerber assimi-
lated all of this, I think he'd have a tougher time, for example, 
supporting the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence regarding 
essentially domestic matters such as sexual orientation or school 
prayer. Surely one who took seriously Federalism would find it 
difficult to justify many of the "incorporation" decisions which 
have transmogrified wise restrictions on the Federal government 
(to protect state sovereignty) into shackles to be attached to the 
states.12 
Thus, for my money at least, while securing the natural 
rights spoken of in the Declaration was one important goal of 
Constitutional government, it was not the only goal, and a theory 
of interpretation which is dedicated to supra-constitutional prin-
ciples and eschews simple positivism cannot begin and end with 
the Declaration. Indeed, a theory which tried to come to grips 
with the late eighteenth-century conceptions of natural law, re-
vealed religion, civic republican philosophy, dual state and fed-
11. See generally Kloppenberg, 74 J. Am. Hist. (cited in note 3); Presser, Recaptur-
ing the Constitution (cited in note 4). 
12. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution at 160-66 (cited in note 4). 
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eral sovereignty, and Lockean natural rights might even end up 
precise enough to avoid the need to pursue higher levels of gen-
erality, and thus the problem of arbitrariness could be contained. 
When we needed Constitutional change, then, we would not rely 
on the judges' senses of how higher levels of Lockean theory 
would resolve the problem, we could-as Gerber quite wisely 
recommends as a check on the Justices (pp. 139-144)-simply use 
the Article V process, and amend the document. 
But this last is the familiar rant of the reviewer that if he 
were writing the book he would have written a different one.13 
On Gerber's own terms his book ought to be regarded as a suc-
cessful and quite comprehensive proposal for rethinking Consti-
tutional law in general and the selection and operation of 
Supreme Court Justices in particular. It is written with sparkle 
and passion and with a lucidity rare in works about Constitu-
tional hermeneutics. It deserves to be widely read, debated, and 
improved upon by other scholars and by Gerber himself. Indeed, 
To Secure These Rights ought to attract the attention not only of 
scholars of constitutional law, but of those of history, politics, 
and moral philosophy. Perhaps it will even do its part in bringing 
us back the kind of synthesis of those fields that the framers en-
joyed, and without which interpretation faithful to the original 
understanding cannot take place. 
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE. By 
Gerald Gunther.l New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp. 
ix, 818. Cloth, $39.00; Paper, $19.95. 
John Wertheimer2 
Like countless other students, I got my first serious exposure 
to the intricacies of American constitutionalism through the 
pages of Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, the leading 
casebook in the field. At the time, I thought it strange that, amid 
13. Made more ironic here because I did, and attempted to derive supra-constitu· 
tional principles, and apply them to present problems in much the same way that Gerber 
did. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 4). He does a much better 
job than I did, however, at clearly laying out a coherent and widespread understanding of 
his particular brand of extra-constitutional interpretive guides, tackles a wider field of 
contemporary problems, and offers a more expansive set of remedies for containing judi-
cial arbitrariness. (pp. 134-61) 
1. Professor of Constitutional Law, Stanford University. 
2. Assistant Professor of History, Davidson College. 
